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Abstract
The Adwords problem has always been an interesting internet adver-
tising problem. There are many ways to solve the Adwords problem with
adversarial order model, including the Greedy Algorithm, the Balance Al-
gorithm and the Scale-bid Algorithm, which is also known as MSVV. In
this survey, I will review the Adwords problem with different input models
under a primal-dual setting, and with the small-bid assumption. In the
first section, I will focus on Adwords with adversarial order model, and
use duality to prove the efficiency of the Greedy Algorithm and the MSVV
algorithm. Next, I will look at a primal-dual training-based algorithm for
the Adwords problem with the IID model.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, almost all of the technology companies, such as Google and Yahoo,
need to face a combinatorial problem of assigning user queries to advertisers to
maximize the total revenue. Specifically, a search engine might receive offers
from n different companies: each month, company u wants to pay at most Bu
dollars in advertising; Company u is willing to pay wuv if its ad appears when
word v is searched. The goal of the search engine is to maximize the profit of the
search engine, which equals to the total amount of money spent by advertisers.
1.1 Combinatorial Formulation
Mathematically, we are given a set of n nodes U , with each u ∈ U having budget
Bu. At each time i = 1, . . . , t: A node vi arrives, bids wuvi are displayed, and
we must decide either to match vi to u ∈ U and earn min(wuvi , RBu), or not
to match vi to any node (i.e., no ad is shown when vi is searched). RBu stands
for the remaining budget for node u. We aim to maximize the total amount of
money spent by advertiser.
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1.2 Duality Review
Before I dive into the IP formulation of the problem, I first give a quick review
of primal-dual formulation and duality theorem.
For every LP in the form
max cTx
s.t. Ax 6 b
x > 0,
call this the primal problem, there always exist a dual problem associate to it
in the following form
min bT y
s.t. AT y > c
y > 0.
We have also seen in class that cTx 6 bTy for any feasible solution of the primal
x, and any feasible solution of the dual y. In other words, the value of any
feasible solution to the dual yields an upper bound on the value of any feasible
solution to the primal. In addition, if x¯ is the optimal solution to the primal
and y¯ is the optimal solution to the dual, we have cT x¯ = bT y¯ (the costs/object
value coincide).
Now, what remains to be crucially important in this paper is the comple-
mentary slackness: Let s = b − Ax > 0, w = AT y − c > 0 be the nonnegative
primal and dual slacks. Then bT y¯ = cT x¯ (obtain optimal solution), iff yT s = 0
and wTx = 0. In other words, if x¯i > 0 for some i, then the corresponding dual
slack is 0 (constraint is tight), i.e., ATi y¯ = ci, and if the primal slack is nonzero
(constraint not tight), i.e., ATi x¯ < bi, then corresponding dual variable y¯i = 0.
Similar logic follows for dual variable and dual slack.
1.3 Primal-dual Formulation
Buchbinder et al.[1] studied the Adwords problem with the small bids assump-
tion using the Primal-Dual approach. For now we assume the Adwords problem
is offline, which means that the complete bipartite graph is available to us and
we can solve the optimal solution. We first look at the primal problem. The
formulation is as follows:
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max
∑
u,v
xuvwuv max w
Tx
s.t.∀u :
∑
v
xuvwuv 6 Bu s.t.Ax 6 b
∀v :
∑
u
xuv 6 1 A =
[
wT
eT
]
b =
[
Bu
e
]
xuv > 0
Note xuv = 1 if we match v ∈ V to u ∈ U and earn wuv, and xuv = 0 otherwise.
The first constraint states that the total amount company u pays cannot exceed
its budget, and the second constraint says that each person can only be shown
to at most one ad. The solution could be fractional but rounding-off lose very
little in the object value.
We can construct the dual problem:
min
∑
u
Buαu +
∑
v
βv min b
Ty
s.t.∀u, v : wuvαu + βv > wuv s.t.AT y > w
αu > 0 ∀u
βv > 0 ∀v
Remark: by complementary slackness, we know that (1): If xi > 0 for some i,
then the corresponding dual constraint is satisfied at equality, i.e., ATi y¯ = wi;
(2): If yi > 0 for some i, then the corresponding primal constraint is satisfied
at equality, i.e., Aix¯ = bi; (3) If Aix¯ < bi, then yi = 0. Therefore the optimal
primal and dual solutions {xuv, αu, βv} must satisfy the following conditions:
xuv > 0→ wuv(1 − αu) = βv (1)
αu > 0→
∑
v
xuvwuv = Bu (2)
∑
v
xuvwuv < Bu → αu = 0 (3)
βu > 0→
∑
u
xuv = 1
Since the first constraint of the primal problem gives us wuv(1 − αu) 6 βv,
comparing to equation (1), we can conclude that
Rule (1): v is allocated (ie., xuv > 0) to the bidder who maximizes the
scaled bid wuv(1− αu).
In other words, given only the optimal dual variables αu, one can reconstruct
the optimal primal solution by assigning each v to the bidder u who maximizes
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wuv(1− αu). Equation (2) and (3) tells us that
Rule 2: αu is positive only for bidders u who have finished their
budget and remains to be 0 if budget not finished.
In the online Primal-dual problem, one can utilize these two rules, i.e., maintain
a best estimate for the optimal dual variables αu and use the first rule when
deciding which u to assign.
2 Online Greedy Algorithm and MSVV Algo-
rithm
2.1 Greedy Algorithm
I first provide the Greedy Algorithm for the online Adwords problem:
Initialize : αu = 0 ∀u, βv = 0 ∀v, xuv = 0 ∀u, v.
When the next vertex v ∈ V arrives:
If v has no available neighbors, continue
Match v to that available neighbor u∗ which maximizes biduv
Update: α∗u =
{
1 if u∗ has finished its budget
0 if u∗ has not yet finished its budget
βv = bidu∗v > biduv
xu∗v = 1
Note that the because of the small-bid assumptions, when each v arrives, we
can assume that biduv = min(wuv , RBu) = wuv, i.e., taking biduv will never
exceed the remaining budget of u. Also note that since every available vertex
u has αu = 0 (hasn’t finished its budget), it is the same as saying ”match v to
the available neighbor u∗ which maximizes biduv(1− αu).”
Theorem 1. Greedy achieves a ratio of 12 for the Adwords problem with the
small-bids assumption.
I prove this theorem by showing that at the end of the algorithm, the solution
is feasible for both the primal and the dual problem, and the primal objective
value is at least one half of the optimal value. I start by proving a proposition:
Proposition 2. For the Adwords problem with the small-bids assumption, if
at the end of the algorithm, the primal objective is at least 1
k
times the dual
objective, then the algorithm achieves a ratio of 1
k
of the optimal solution.
Proof. Define Primal as the primal objective value, Dual as the dual objective
value, Dual∗ as the optimal dual value, and OPT as the optimal objective value.
We have the following:
Primal > 1
k
Dual > 1
k
Dual∗ = 1
k
OPT .
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The first inequality is given. Since the dual problem is minimization, we must
have Dual > Dual∗ for Dual∗ to be optimal. By strong duality, we also have
Dual∗ = OPT .
We now prove Theorem 1:
Proof. (1) Feasibility: I first prove the algorithm outputs a feasible solution
through demonstrating that the primal and the dual problems are both feasible.
First the primal solution is feasible since we only allocate v to the bidder u who
has not finished its budget yet, and allocate v to only one bidder. For the dual
problem constraint, at the end of the algorithm, if u has finished its budget, we
know αu = 1 and clearly wuvαu+βv > wuv. If u still has budget remaining, we
need to show βv > wuv. However, at each iteration as we asign v, we pick u such
that u∗ maximizes wu∗v and update βv = wu∗v. Therefore, βv = wu∗v > wuv.
(2) Ratio:By proposition 2, we need to show that the objective is at least
1
2 of the dual objective. At each iteration when v shows up, we allocate it
to the optimal u∗, and two cases might occur: u∗ has finished its budget by
spending wu∗v, or u
∗ still has budget available. In the latter case, the primal
objective increases by xu∗vwu∗v = wu∗v, and the dual objective also increases
by βv = wu∗v. In the former case, both objective increase by wu∗v, and in
the dual objective function, α∗u also increases from 0 to 1. Therefore we add
Bu∗ =
∑
v∈S
wu∗v where S is the set of all v
′s asigned to u∗. Thus we count all of
the wu∗v again for all of the previously v allocated to u. The worst case being
that all u′s have finished their budget and the dual objective value is twice as
the primal one. In other words, the primal objective is at least 12 times the dual
objective.
2.2 Online MSVV Algorithm
In the greedy algorithm, we set the dual αu to 0 or 1. Similarly, we can find
the best online dual variables αu as a function of the fraction of budget spent
in the MSVV algorithm. For simplicity we take all budget Bu = 1, ∀u. Define
k = 1
1− 1
e
xu=fraction of budget of u that has been spent so far
f(x) = e
x
−1
e−1 , ∀x ∈ [0, 1]
∆uv(x) = f
′(x)wuv = ke
x−1wuv
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I now provide the online MSVV algorithm:
Initialize : αu = 0 ∀u, βv = 0 ∀v
When the next vertex v ∈ V arrives:
If v has no available neighbors, continue
Match v to that available neighbor u∗ which maximizes kwuv −∆uv(xu)
Update: αu = αu +∆uv(x
∗
u)
βv = kwuv −∆uv(x∗u)
Remark: Note that while deciding which u we assign v to, we have
kwuv −∆uv(xu) = kwuv(1− exu−1) = kwuv(1 − e−(1−xu)),
where (1−xu) = Bu−xu = RBu stands for the remaning budget of u. Therefore
it is equivalent to assign the incoming node v to a neighbor u that maximizes
wuvf(
RBu
Bu
) = wuvf(RBu), which we have seen in class.
Theorem 3. Online MSVV algorithm achieves ratio 1
k
= 1− 1
e
for the Adwords
problem with the small bids assumption.
Again I prove the theorem by showing feasiblity and the primal-dual ratio.
I first prove another proposition:
Proposition 4. At any point in time, αu = f(xu), ∀u ∈ U .
Proof. WLOG, given u ∈ U , suppose at any given time t, v1, . . . , vk were allo-
cated to u so far in that order, and let x1, . . . , xk be the spending of u up until
the times when v1, . . . , vk arrives. Note that the cumulative spending of u as vi
arrives equals to the sum of all previous costs/bids (wuvj ), where j = 1, . . . , i−1.
Thus we have xi =
∑i−1
j=1 wuvj . According to our algorithm, at the time vk has
been assigned to u, αu =
∑k
i=1∆uvi(xi). Thus we have
αu =
∑k
i=1 ∆uvi(
∑i−1
j=1 wuvj ) =
∫ xu
x=0
kex−1dx = k(exu−1 − e−1) = exu−1
e−1
We have the second equality because we assume that every piece of wuvi is
infinitely small, and thus can repleace it by an integral.
Proof. (1) Feasibility: First, the primal solution is feasible since we only
assign v to u who has not finished its budget. Now I show the feasibility for the
dual problem, i.e., at the end of algorithm: wuvαu + βv > wuv, or equivalently
βv > wuv(1 − αu). When an arbitrary v arrives, suppose we assign it to u∗,
and let xu∗ be the fraction of budgets spent by u
∗. Let u be some other bidders
that is not optimal and let xu be the fraction of budgets spent by u. Note
kwu∗v − ∆u∗v(xu∗) > kwuv − ∆uv(xu) since in each iteration we pick u that
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maximizes the value of the expression. Let Xu be the fraction of budget spent
by u at the end of the algorithm (xu 6 Xu). We have
βv = kwu∗v −∆u∗v(xu∗) (by definition of β)
> kwuv −∆uv(xu)
= wuv(k − kexu−1) = 1− e
xu−1
e− 1
= wuv(1− f(xu)) > wuv(1− f(Xu) (by monotonicity of f(x))
= wuv(1− αu)
(2) Primal-Dual Ratio: In each iteration, the primal objective increases by
wuv, and the dual objective increases by αu+βv = ∆uv(xu)+kwuv−∆uv(xu) =
kwuv. Therefore at the ned of the algorithm, the primal objective is at least
1
k
times the dual objective, by Proposision 2, the proof is complete.
3 Primal-dual Training-based Algorithm
In this section, I first introduce the general class of packing linear programs
(PLP), and then introduce the primal-dual training-based algorithm and prove
that it achieves ”1 − O(ǫ)” approximation for the online stochastic PLP prob-
lem with high probability with mild assumptions. The ”1 − O(ǫ)” approxima-
tion/competitive means that with high probability under the randomness in
the stochastic model, the algorithm achieves at least 1 − O(ǫ) fraction of the
objective value of the offline optimal solution (OPT ) for the actual instance.
3.1 The General Class of PLP
Let J be a set of m resources, and each resource j ∈ J has a capacity cj . The
set of resources and their capacities are known in advance. Let I be a set of n
agents that arrive one by one online, each with a set of options Oi. Each option
o ∈ Oi of agent i has an associated value wio > 0 and requires aioj units of
each resource j. The set of options and the values wio and aioj arrive together
with agent i. When an agent arrives, the algorithm has to immdediately decide
whether to assign the agent and which option to choose. The goal is to find a
maximum− value allocation that does not allocate more of any resource than
is available.
Remark 1: Comparing to the AdWords problem, we can see that J = U
stands for the set of companies/advertisers, each of which has budget cj = Bu
available. I = V is the set of nodes arrives. As vi arrives, it has a set of
options Oi = {available neighbors u}. Each option has an associated value
wio = aioj = wij .
Remark 2: Since PLP is a generalization of AdWords problem, where the key
difference being that wio and aioj are unrelated in PLP, this algorithm also
applies to AdWords problem, for which the proof is even simpler.
We only need to adjust the formulation in Section 1.2 a little bit to adapt the
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PLP. For convenience, we manipulate the first constraint of the primal: we
divide both sides by cj(= Bu), and the right-hand side becomes 1, the left-hand
side becomes a∗ioj = aioj/cj. We use notation aioj representing a
∗
ioj below for
simplicity. Also note that i ≡ v and {o ∈ Oi} ≡ u. The primal and dual follows:
max
∑
i
∑
o∈Oi
xiowio min
∑
j
αj +
∑
i
βi
∀j :
∑
i
xioaioj 6 1 ∀i, o : aiojαj + βi > wio
∀v :
∑
o∈Oi
xio 6 1 αj , βi > 0
xio > 0
3.2 Training-Based Primal-Dual Algorithm (PTAS)
We define n to be the total number of agents, m as the number of constraints,
q = maxi|Oi| as the maximum number of options for any agent. Finally, define
the gain from option o ∈ Oi as wio−
∑
j αjaioj . Recall in the MSVV Algorithm,
we match v to u which maximizes βv = kwuv−∆uv(xu) = kwuv(1−e−(1−xu)) =
wuvf(RBu). In other words, βv is the maximum ”gain” we obtain as each v
comes. Also recall that αu = f(xu)∀u ∈ U . Therefore, the gain in PLP,
if applied to Adwords Problem, is wuv −
∑
u αuwuv = wuv(1 −
∑
u αu) =
wuv(Bu −
∑
u f(xu)) = wuvf(RBu) (we have already normalized Bu = 1).
We can see the nice analogy between gain, βv, and what we have seen in class.
The main idea behind the algorithm is to solve the LP on a sample of the
queries. Note that we cannot expect to get a representative sample of all types
of agents from a small sample. In other words, we cannot expect to estimate
the ditribution of wio and aioj . We then use only the dual variables αj and βi
from the sampled LP to guide us for solving the rest of query stream.
Algorithm:
1. Let S denote the first ǫn agents in the sequence. We do not select these
agents for the purpose of analysis. May assign them according to some online
algorithm. Let Dˆ denote the sampled version of the dual program on the agents
in S with following changes: for all j ∈ [m], replace cj by ǫcj , which is equivalent
to reducing the capacity of a constraint from 1 to ǫ (i.e., change the right-hand
side of the first constraint to ǫ).
2. Solve Dˆ, let α∗j denote the value of the dual variable for constraint j in this
optimal solution.
3. For each subsequent agent i, select the option o that provides maximum gain,
and set βi = gain(o). Let wmax = maxi,o{wio}, amax = maxi,o,j{aioj}. Note
α∗j serves as a cost/price per unit of the resource for the remaining agents.
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3.3 Theorem and Proof
Theorem 5. The Training-Based Primal-Dual algorithm is (1−O(ǫ))-competitive
for the online stochastic PLP problem with high probability, as long as folloing
conditions hold: (1) maxi,o{ wioOPT } 6 ǫ(m+1)(lnn+lnq) and (2) maxi,o{
aioj
cj
} 6
ǫ3
(m+1)(lnn+lnq) .
Remark: Note that the first condition means that no individual option
provides too large a fraction of the total value, and the second condition is
equivalent to say that no individual option for any agent consumes too much of
any resource.
The key idea behind the proof is that if α∗i satisfies the complementary
slackness condition on the first ǫn agents (being an optimal solution for our
sample), then w.h.p it approximately satisfies these conditions on the entire set.
I begin the proof by introducing some key definitions.
Definition 1. Let I∗ ⊆ I denote the set of agents i with some option o having
non-negative gain, i.e., the set of agents that will be allocated to some resource
j (we do not assign any agent i that provides negative gain). Let O∗ denote the
set of pairs {(i, o)|i ∈ I∗, o = argmaxo∈O(i)gain(o)}, i.e., the set of best possible
allocations between all agents i ∈ I and all resources j ∈ J . Let O∗(S) =
O∗ ∩ S, the best possible allocation for the sampled queries. Consequently, we
have O∗ −O∗(S) represents the allocation of options selected by our algorithm.
Remark: For the purpose of analysis, our algorithm do not select any
options for agents in S. In our algorithm, given a vector α∗, by selecting for
each agent in I∗, the option o that maximizes gain(o) for {i ∈ I∗, o ∈ O(i)}, i.e.,
(i, o) ∈ O∗ and set βi = gain(o), we obtain a feasible solution to the Dual-LP.
Because of the analogy between βv in MSVV and βi = gain(o), the proof is
analogous to the feasibility proof for theorem 3 and is omitted here.
Definition 2. LetW =
∑
(i,o)∈O∗ wio be the total weight of selected options, and
W (S) =
∑
(i,o)∈O∗(S) wio be the total weight of selected options of the sample.
Let C(j) =
∑
(i,o)∈O∗ aioj be the total consumed resources for j ∈ J and similarly
C(j, S) =
∑
(i,o)∈O∗(S) aioj.
For any fixed vector α∗, O∗,W, and each C(j) are independent of the choice
of the sample S. Thus the expected value of W (S) is ǫW , and that of C(j, S) is
ǫC(j). Also note that after implementing some online algorithm for the sampled
queries, the result should be close to ǫW and ǫC(j).
Definition 3. For a sample S and j ∈ [m], let rj(S) = |C(j, S) − ǫC(j)|, and
let t(S) = |W (S) − ǫW |. When refering to the sample, we abbreviate rj(S) as
rj and t(S) as t.
1. The sample S is rj − bad if:
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rj > (m+ 1)(lnn+ lnq)amax +
√
C(j)(2
√
ǫ(m+ 1)(ln(n) + lnq)amax).
2. The sample S is t− bad if:
t > (m+ 1)(lnn+ lnq)wmax +
√
W (2
√
ǫ(m+ 1)(ln(n) + lnq)wmax)
Now I prove Theorem 5, our central theorem. For the following parts, we
assume the condtions of Theorem 5 hold. We prove Theorem 5 by proving the
following two propositions:
Proposition 6. If the sample S is not t-bad or rj − bad for any constraint j,
the value of the options selected by the algorithm is (1−O(ǫ))OPT .
Proposition 7. The sample S has high probability to be good for any fixed α∗,
i.e., not t-bad or rj-bad for any j.
Therefore, the combination of the two propositions tell us that, with high
probability, our algorithm returns a feasible solution with value at least (1 −
O(ǫ))OPT , completing the proof of Theorem 5.
I first prove Proposition 6 by first proving another lemma.
Lemma. Let j ∈ [m] be a constraint such that C(j, S) = ǫ. If S is not rj− bad,
under constraints of theorem 5, we have 1− 2ǫ 6 C(j) 6 1 + 3(ǫ+ ǫ2).
Proof. Given S is not rj − bad, we have |C(j, S) − ǫC(j)| 6 (m + 1)(lnn +
lnq)amax+
√
C(j)(2
√
ǫ(m+ 1)(ln(n) + lnq)amax). ConsequentlyC(j, S)−ǫC(j) 6
(m + 1)(lnnq)amax +
√
C(j)(2
√
ǫ(m+ 1)(ln(nq)amax). By our assumption in
theorem 5, we also have amax 6 ǫ
3/((m+1)(lnnq)). Hence by substituing amax,
we have
C(j, S)− ǫC(j) = ǫ− ǫC(j) 6 ǫ3 +
√
C(j)(2
√
ǫǫ3) = ǫ3 + 2
√
C(j)ǫ2
Then
1− C(j) 6 ǫ2 + 2ǫ
√
C(j)
C(j) + 2ǫ
√
C(j) + ǫ2 > 1
(
√
C(j)) + ǫ)2 > 1√
C(j)) + ǫ > 1
C > 1 + ǫ2 − 2ǫ > 1− 2ǫ
The upper bound proof is similar.
Now I prove Proposition 6:
Proof. Let D =
∑
j α
∗
j +
∑
i∈O∗ βi be the value of the feasible dual solution
obtained by setting βi = gain(o) for each (i, o) ∈ O∗. By weak duality, the
dual objective value D serves as an upper bound on the optimal solution OPT .
Showing that
∑
(i,o)∈O∗−O∗(S) wio > (1 − O(ǫ))D > (1 − O(ǫ))OPT suffices
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to prove the proposition. Let J1 denote the set of constraints j ∈ m such
that α∗j > 0, and J2 = [m] − J1 be the set of constraints such that α∗j = 0.
Propsition 6 implis that if for some j ∈ m, the capacity of j has been used up,
i.e., C(j, S) = ǫ, then recall Rule 2 by complementary slackness, which guides
through all the algorithms, α∗j should be positive, i.e., in set J1. Therefore, for
each constraint j ∈ J1, complementary slackness and previous lemma imply that
if S is not rj-bad, then C(j) > 1−2ǫ. Also for (i, o) ∈ O∗, recall that we allocate
agent i ∈ I∗ to o that maximizes gain(o), i.e., xio > 0. Again by complementary
slackness, we have the slack variables in the Dual-LP constraints equal to 0,
i.e., βi +
∑
j α
∗
jaioj = wio. Now
W =
∑
(i,o)∈O∗
wio =
∑
(i,o)∈O∗
(βi +
∑
j
α∗jaioj) =
∑
i∈I∗
βi +
∑
j
(α∗j
∑
(i,o)∈O∗
aioj) =
∑
i∈I∗
βi +
∑
j
α∗jC(j) =
∑
i∈I∗
βi +
∑
j∈J1
α∗jC(j) +
∑
j∈J2
α∗jC(j) >∑
i∈I∗
βi +
∑
j∈J1
α∗j (1− 2ǫ) >
∑
i∈I∗
βi(1 − 2ǫ) +
∑
j∈J1
α∗j (1− 2ǫ) = (1− 2ǫ)D.
Since the options for agents in S were not selected by our algorithm, the total
value obtained by the algorithm is W −W (S). Since S is not t-bad, we have by
Definition 3,W (S) 6 ǫW +(m+1)(lnnq)wmax+
√
W (2
√
ǫ(m+ 1)(lnnq)wmax).
The first assumption of Theorem 5 gives us wmax 6 OPTǫ/(m + 1)(ln(nq)).
We then have (m+ 1)(lnnq)wmax 6 ǫOPT . Hence by substitution
W (S) 6 ǫW + ǫOPT + 2
√
W
√
ǫ2OPT 6 O(ǫW )
Therefore∑
(i,o)∈O∗−O∗(S) wio =W −W (S) > W −O(ǫW ) = W (1−O(ǫ)) > D(1−O(ǫ))
Now I prove Proposition 7 by first proving another two lemma.
Lemma. Pr[S is rj-bad] 6
1
m(nq)m+1 for each j, and Pr[S is t-bad] 6
1
(nq)m+1 .
The proof is simple and thus omitted here. The details of the proof could
be found in [2]. This lemma implies that for any fixed α∗, the probability that
a random sample S of agents is bad is less than 2(nq)m+1 . This is because S is
bad if any j is rj -bad or t-bad. Therefore Pr[S is bad] =
∑
j Pr[S is rj-bad] +
Pr[S is t-bad] − some positive intersection probability 6 1(nq)m+1 + 1(nq)m+1 =
2
(nq)m+1 .
Lemma. There are fewer than (nq)m distinct solutions α∗ that are returned by
the algorithm after step 2 of our algorithm.
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Proof. Recall that an optimal (vertex) solution to the Dual-LP on the reduced
instance is defined purely by the n-dimensional vector α∗. The vertex solution
is decided by picking m constraints, set them to equality, and solve the system.
For each of the n agents, there are at most q such constraints, and thus at most
nq constraints in total. Consequently, we are picking m of them from at most
nq of them, and thus there are at most
(
nq
m
)
possible combinations and thus
(
nq
m
)
vertices of the polytope defined by optimal solutions α∗.
I now prove Proposition 7:
Proof. The first lemma imples that for any fixed α∗, the probability that a
random sample S of agents is bad is less than 2(nq)m+1 . The second lemma tells
that there are at most (nq)m distinct choices for α∗. Therefore the probability
that S is bad is less than 2
nq
, i.e., the sample is good for any α∗ with high
probability. We then finish proving Proposition 7.
We then complete the proof of our central theorem, Theorem 5.
Remark: As we can see from the whole proof, the accuracy of the Training-
Based Primal-Dual algorithm is bounded by two components: the strictness of
the inequaility of the two conditions in Theorem 5, i.e., the smaller the value
of the right-hand side of two inequalities, the more likely the algorithm would
perform better on the remaning agents; and the accuracy of the α∗i solved for
the sampled dual. As ǫ increases, the sample we study becomes larger, and α∗i
is more accurate. However, as ǫ increases, the bound of the maxi,o{ wioOPT } and
maxi,o{aiojcj } becomes less strict, and therefore the performance of the algorithm
decreases. In general, the former effects outweights the latter one, as long as
the sample we study is not too small, making it 1−O(ǫ) competitive. We need
to find a balance between the two effects and choose ǫ not too large and not too
small.
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